We contribute to the literature of European Studies by introducing the approach of Neighbourhood Europeanization. Based on insights from Membership and Enlargement Europeanization, we reveal important inconsistencies of Neighbourhood Europeanization through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as well as a lack of robust empirical support for its effectiveness. We also define core dimensions and determinants of Neighbourhood Europeanization and implement this analytical framework for the case of Ukraine. Our analysis clearly demonstrates substantial asymmetries in the ENP for Ukraine across three dimensions we chose -democracy promotion, economic cooperation, and Justice and Home Affairs, which clearly reflect the inconsistency of the ENP concept, that is top-down formulation of EU interests combined with weak conditionality. However, our analysis shows that despite Ukraine's growing frustration because of the lack of a membership perspective, there is a lot of room for keeping up Ukraine's motivation for Europeanization reforms. Especially, widening and strengthening the linkage-mechanisms would allow to overcome ENP inconsistency and to improve the effectiveness of Neighborhood Europeanization.
Introduction -The External Dimension of Europeanization

1
Theoretical and empirical research on neighbourhood policies is not yet well rooted in the literature on Europeanization. The concept of Europeanization was introduced during the early 1990s and has, by now, become a rather fashionably and widely deployed research tool amongst scholars from International
Relations, European Studies and Comparative Government traditions alike (see e.g. Axt et al. 2007 ).
However, being still a relatively young research field, it has only been recognized at the end of the 1990s
as a "distinctive research area in EU studies" (Sedelmeier 2006: 4) . When reviewing the rapidly growing body literature from the early 1990s to the present day, it is possible to identify three distinct phases and -consequently -three dimensions of Europeanization research, where each new dimension draws on and adds to the previous one:
Membership Europeanization
• , which delineates the impact of the European Union (EU) on existing EU member states,
Enlargement Europeanization
• , which applies to accession and candidate countries with a clear EUmembership perspective, and, more tentatively, what we would label
Neighbourhood Europeanization
• , which affects the EU's neighbouring "outsiders", where there is no immediate accession perspective. In this paper we try to partly fill this gap by providing a case study for Ukraine. The case of Ukraine seems to be a natural choice for a first case study because, according to the methodological case categorization by Hague/Harrop (1998), we can regard Ukraine as a crucial case among the ENP countries which allows to derive country specific as well as more general findings. We regard Ukraine as having best preconditions for successful membership in ENP, because of its willingness of cooperation and its regime quality as well as its high interest to become an EU member. As Ukraine is the most promising crucial case, we follow this most-likely design (George/Bennett 2005) in order to basically understand prospects of Europeanization through ENP.
As regards Enlargement Europeanization
In order to develop an appropriate design for our case study, Section 2 discusses differences and parallels between the different types of Europeanization mentioned above, revealing important inconsistencies 1 A reviewed version of this working paper will be published in 'Journal of Common Market Studies' end of 2009/ beginning of 2010. This paper is an output of the ENEPO (EU Eastern Neighbourhood: Economic Potential and Future Development) project financed by the EU in the Sixth Framework Program. We are grateful for support and helpful comments from Anja Franke, Marietta König and Joachim Koops..
of Neighbourhood Europeanization through the ENP as well as a lack of robust empirical support for its effectiveness. In Section 3, we define the dimensions and determinants of Neighbourhood Europeanization.
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Section 4 implements this analytical framework for the case of Ukraine by explaining the links between Europeanization and its determinants. Section 5 summarizes and draws conclusions.
Neighbourhood Europeanization -Can Weak Conditionality Work?
Concerning Enlargement Europeanization, most empirical evidence seems to support the external incentive model which explains the broad pattern of successful rule transfer to the candidate countries. According to the rationalist external incentive model, which is seen as EU-driven, the EU offers a combination of conditionality and rewards (assistance and institutional ties), although the EU's conditionality is restricted to very low forms of "punishment" that are smaller steps towards integration. Rewards are needed to reach the adoption of EU's rules and they will have to exceed the domestic adoption costs. Nevertheless, in this model, success depends on determinacy of conditions, size and speed of rewards, and credibility of conditionality (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004: 664f; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005: 9f) . Alternative models like social learning and lesson drawing have been regarded as being less important as norm and value based parts of Europeanization and were considered as merely supportive (Schimmelfennig 2007 The final aim of the ENP cannot be and, in fact, is not total harmonization with the EU's acquis communautaire. What is, however, expected is a certain level of approximation (see Lavenex et al. 2007 ). Yet the official rhetoric remains diffuse. What makes it so difficult to classify, is the fact that ENP policy is situated somewhere between internal and foreign policy (see e.g. Vobruba 2007 ). On the one hand, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) until now has been dominated by the member states (therefore not in the hands of the Commission except in the case of external trade, development and humanitarian aid policy) and still requires consensus. On the other hand, "ENP is also an extension and adaptation of the Commission's active foreign policy role during enlargement. The ENP has largely been conceptualized within DG Enlargement. Only recently was it transferred to the External Relations DG. This is consistent with March and Olsen's [neo-institutionalist] […] argument that actors take on roles, which then in turn shape their behaviour" (Kelley 2006: 31) . However, in the ENP there is a concurrence of EU's supranational level (commission) and nation state level (ministerial council), which is maybe the reason for the inconsistent policy.
countries we use the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) which, in our view, provides a more comprehensive measure of institutional quality. In pooled regressions which account for cross-country as well as for time-series aspects, we can confirm a positive impact of EU integration on institutional quality. For Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) which are the first step of this integration, the improvement of institutions in cooperating countries would lie in the range of about 0.2 which, given a standard deviation of 1 for the index, seems to be substantial. However, as shown by the regression with effect fixed between countries, that is only considering changes over time (last column), the positive impact of EU Integration is not due to improvements of institutional quality over time but rather between countries -a grain of salt for too much optimism about institutional change supported by basic EU agreements. Interestingly, entry into the accession process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has a significant effect over time, that is these countries actually improved institutional quality. The 'carrot' in this case is regional security rather than economic cooperation. The prospect of NATO accession might have a positive effect, which might be comparable to the impact of EU accession (see e.g.
Schimmelfennig 2007; Pop-Eleches 2007)
. Hence, the message is that basic EU agreements can provide positive incentives for better governance, empirical support for such an optimistic view is rather weak, and security issues seem to play an increasing role as an incentive for Neighbourhood Europeanization. All in all, given the conceptual inconsistency of the concept of ENP discussed above it seems rather unlikely that weak incentives are well-targeted in order to achieve a significant impact on governance in ENP countries.
Europeanization through ENP -In Search of a Concept
In order to test for the effectiveness of ENP policies in neighbouring countries, we develop a concept for a qualitative analysis which we apply to the case of Ukraine. First, we show that three dimensions of ENP policies have to be distinguished for our purpose. Second, we determine the dependent variable, Europeanization through ENP, and the independent variables which might explain the dependent variable.
Applied to the case of Ukraine, this will reveal the extent to which dependent variables can be linked to Europeanization achieved through ENP.
Dimensions of ENP Policies
As argued above, ENP policies still follow the enlargement blueprint which distinguishes between democracy promotion and sectoral cooperation (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004: 669f) . In contrast to a comprehensive idea of sectoral cooperation during enlargement, ENP concentrates on specific areas which figure high on the EU's list of priorities embedded to various degrees in country-specific Action Plans Bottom-up strategies should support non-state actors and those institutions, not belonging to high level politics, that is civil society, the education system, and the media. Concerning the civil society and the education system, ENP offers financial support through TACIS/EIDHR and TEMPUS respectively. While TACIS refers to infrastructural help and EIDHR to bottom-up democracy promotion, TEMPUS is regarded to help with higher education modernization, people-to-people-contacts among European students and, thus, linkage between East and West (see e.g. Council Decision 1999). The long-term nature of these programmes allows comparing ENP activities with the pre-ENP era. Finally, freedom of media is an essential part of supporting democracy in neighbouring countries. In contrast to the OSCE, the EU is a rather young player in the field of media support but views the instrument of media support as a central tool of democracy promotion (see e.g. von Franqué 2008) . Clearly, the great scope of influence has to be evaluated against the danger of misbalancing national media markets.
Economic Cooperation: "The basic deal the EU has offered the ENP states consists of economic cooperation in exchange for political reforms" (Vincentz 2007: 117) . However, the economic dimension of ENP remains rather vague. The Action Plans give only broad guidelines and do not give threshold levels for eventual achievement (Noutcheva/Emerson 2007: 91) . Different to EU enlargement and Balkan policies, ENP has a development component and is strictly bilateral (see e.g. the approach of ENP as a "hub-and-spoke"model in Hummer 2005), which foregoes the chance of creating a unified economic region. 5 There is a huge debate on appropriate models of future economic integration between ENP members and EU. The scope 5 Recently, the EU announced a regional initiative 'Eastern Neighbours of the EU' -that is Eastern Partnershipthat includes Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership foresees a substantial upgrading of the level of political engagement, including the prospect of a new generation of Association Agreements, far-reaching integration into the EU economy, easier travel to the EU for citizens providing that security requirements are met, enhanced energy security arrangements benefiting all concerned, and increased financial assistance. The EU proposes much more intensive day to day support for partners' reform efforts through a new Comprehensive Institution Building program, and a new multilateral dimension which will bring partners together to address common challenges. between ENP state and EU, they mostly remain rather unspecific (see e.g. Stratenschulte 2005 ) and have been very much dependent on the will to approximation from the side of the ENP state.
Level of Compliance and Determinants of Europeanization
Incentives and rewards:
If we regard enlargement processes, the core incentive is the membership perspective (Grabbe 2001 called this incentive "gate-keeping", hinting on the prospect of slowing/fastening the accession process), which is missing in the ENP. Following recent debates on the ENP, we assume that one has to look at single sectors in order to examine main incentives and rewards. For example in economic cooperation we may assume this is access to Internal Market or, at a lower level, trade liberalization. In JHP, in contrast, this may be visa facilitation (Sedelmeier 2007) . Main incentives in the field of democracy promotion and conflict management are more difficult to identify, which we will show in our case study.
Direct financial support by EU:
There are a couple of financial programmes and special budgets giving financial support to the ENP states (e.g. TACIS, EIDHR, TEMPUS). These have been centralized since 2007 in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), a special financial instrument for ENP.
In our study we try to evaluate changes of financial support since ENP started in contrast to cooperation under PCA.
Forms and degree of linkage:
Given that rewards and direct support may be rather limited in the ENP, linkage defined as "the density of ties and cross-border flows between a particular country and 
Europeanization in Ukraine -From Enthusiasm Back to Reality?
The The institutional framework of EU-Ukraine cooperation, that is annual bilateral presidential summits, cooperation councils, ministerial cooperation committees and specialized sub-committees, was established already in the pre-ENP era. During the current preparations of the New Enhanced Agreement, it was slightly expanded but, overall, it is largely copied from EU enlargement (Gromadzki et al. 2005; Beichelt 2007 ). According to the supranational character of the EU, its institutional cooperation remains very much oriented on cooperation with the executive. There are low ties with the Ukrainian parliament although this would be helpful as well -as the parliament has to harmonize legislation with EU standards.
In Ukraine, the general perception of ENP policies is rather mixed. Domestic elites agree on "European
Choice", but they differ in the time horizons of Ukraine's membership in the EU and in the pace of domestic reforms to achieve its Europeanization. The political leadership is sometimes more involved in power distribution struggles than in carrying out reforms. Furthermore, politicians did not want to appear as "knocking on closed doors". 
Democracy Promotion -Slightly Used Although Highly Potential?
Timely coinciding with the democratic breakthrough (McFaul/Aslund 2006), the EU offered an ENP AP to Ukraine, which put more emphasis on democracy promotion than the PCA document before. Different to PCA, which limited democracy promotion to political dialogue and consultations on the "observance of the principles of democracy", the ENP AP upgrades the scope and intensity of political cooperation and identifies "strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law" among its priorities. 11 Furthermore, the AP envisages a number of concrete demands, rewards and mechanisms to promote democracy in Ukraine, but it contains no substantial linkage mechanisms.
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According to our scheme, we divide them along top-down and bottom-up sub-dimensions.
In terms of top-down democracy promotion, the AP puts very clear demands on Ukraine's compliance with democratic standards, that is ensuring the democratic conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine in accordance with OSCE standards, gradual approximation of Ukraine legislation, norms and standards with those of the EU, the independence of the judiciary and development of 10 The opinion survey shows deep differences in foreign policy orientations between four parts of the country. The EU is largely supported in the western (75 per cent of respondents) and central regions (57 per cent) and less in the southern (37 per cent) and eastern regions (34 per cent) (Razumkov Centre 2008: 48) . 
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In order to support the rule of law, EU membership perspective would be very helpful. Yet, the EU does not offer this reward and thus discourages the elite groups. The New Enhanced Agreement only offers EUAssociation, which is too less attractive to improve the rule of law. Unlike the Council of Europe, the EU also has weak linkage mechanisms here because there are no specialized advisory institutions.
Concerning bottom-up democracy promotion, the EU is less clear in its demands. It stresses the need to develop civil society, to ensure respect for human rights and national minorities, to guarantee freedom of media and to improve systems of higher education. The absence of political rewards in this field is compensated through direct financial support through TACIS, EDIHR, and Tempus facilities. 14 Bottom-up Europeanization focused on civil society and education enjoys strong domestic support (Gromadzki et al.
2005).
13 Solana (2007) , for example, argued that Ukraine has had a series of political crises in the past years, largely stemming from a lack of clarity on the basic ground rules of political life and lack of checks-and-balances, but avoided to blame political elite for these crises.
14 In 2004-06, TACIS included the projects on bottom-up democracy promotion -through the close cooperation with the national government -with the budget of €10 million for civil society, media and democracy. EIDHR is more civil society and human rights oriented; its micro projects-program ensures an additional -without direct involvement of the national government -financial support for civil society. Although Ukraine attracted the largest amount of funds within this Initiative, EDIHR finances are limited: from 1999 to 2006 it allocates only €5.95 million for Ukrainian NGOs. Within ENP, the EU also fosters people-to-people programmes, that is exchange between Ukrainian and EU state's societies. This is first and foremost focused on higher education. The budget line Tempus promoted since 1993 voluntary EU-ization in the field of higher education. The EU also has conducted the extra projects to promote democracy in a bottom-up way. In 2004, the EU launched three election projects combing NGOs, education and media promotion with the funding budget of €1 million (EU Delegation to Ukraine 2004).
Economic Cooperation: Huge Asymmetry of Preferences and Time Horizons
The ENP builds on PCA's economic demands and aims at bringing Ukraine's legislation in compliance with The asymmetry of interest is also evident in the cooperation on energy and transport. Although it is mutually beneficial and contributes to geopolitical security and economic independence of both, Ukraine and the EU, they nevertheless emphasize different preferences in this field. EU's basic goal is to successively extend the principles of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (like the rule of law) to the EU's periphery.
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Ukraine is keen on eliminating its dependency on Russian energy, but got little assistance from the EU in its quest for energy diversification. 16 The EU helps Ukraine to modernize its pipelines system through INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe). The programme was launched in 1995, revised in 2004-06 and involved 21 countries (most participants are the post-communist countries). However, the main aim of this programme is not to directly finance, but to attract foreign investors to the modernization of Ukraine's oil and gas transport system. with the implementation of the 'White Stream' project delivering Caspian gas via Georgia and Ukraine to
Europe. This, however, is -in contrast to the pipeline projects south stream and north stream, which do not include Ukraine -not a priority from the EU's side (Sherr 2007; Stent 2008; Lukyanov 2008) .
Justice and Home Affairs: the EU's Primary Interest?
Before the ENP, the EU demands towards Ukraine were focused on cross border cooperation ( Common regional culture is somehow cut through that, which has a negative impact on the local perception of Europeanization, especially for the pro-EU oriented western regions (Kravchenko 2007; Silina 2008 ).
In addition, it seems to be obvious that further cooperation in JHA issues does not buy any additional rewards, especially no EU concessions with respect to deeper economic integration. As a result, starting in 2008, Ukrainian authorities already started to diminish their support for the cooperation with the EU in JHA (for example postponing of free visa access to new EU-members Romania and Bulgaria) (Silina 2008 
Answering the Dependent Variable: the Level of Europeanization in Ukraine
As mentioned above, our evaluation for answering the dependent variable is primarily based on the EU Progress Report Ukraine (2008) If we compare the dimensions of our analytical framework, it is striking that -according to the Razumkov study -in the dimension "democracy" more than half of the activities were not carried out (19 of 39). This is the only dimension, where the share of open issues is higher than that of the implemented ones. In particular, the Progress Report criticizes a power struggle between parliament and cabinet on the one side and the president on the other side, concerning the scope of power of the cabinet. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an analytical framework for operationalizing Neighbourhood Europeanization through ENP policies. Theoretical and empirical evidence amply demonstrates inconsistencies of the basic ENP-concept: combination of rather high demands with rather weak conditionality. Similarly, our econometric analysis showed that the role of basic cooperation agreements for Europeanization is rather mixed. In addition there are a number of other potential external drivers of institutional change. In particular NATO could play a complementary role offering security related incentives.
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Defining Europeanization as the compliance with EU demands, we investigated the EU-Ukraine Action
Plan by looking at three dimensions of ENP policies -democracy promotion, economic cooperation, and JHA -which are shown to depend on five independent variables -content and clarity of EU demands, incentives and rewards, direct financial support, forms and degree of linkage, and local perception of demands and rewards.
Our conclusion from this case study is that -given the top-down formulation of EU interests combined with weak conditionality -rewards and local perception of demands are decisive variables for the effectiveness of ENP policies in Ukraine. Top-down democracy promotion was effective after the Orange Revolution when the EU granted the full-fledged market status, later the EU gave assistance for WTOmembership. Arguably, this helped business interests to unify and support democratic change (Puglisi 2008) . Democracy promotion was definitely less effective afterwards, as there are low rewards and there is low local perception for top-down democracy promotion. On the contrary, the bottom-up democracy promotion paradoxically benefits from high local support in the Ukrainian society and low demands and rewards. Europeanization in JHA benefited from Ukraine's willingness to converge towards EU-style norms. Demands on better governance of the border regimes of Eastern European states, focuses, first and foremost, on the EU's own security interest. Ukraine is aware of this EU strategy.
Nevertheless, sustainability of this policy seems to be doubtful as there is decreasing hope on the side of Ukraine that voluntary actions pay off in the future. In this respect, future rewards have a potential to motivate Europeanization, only if they are well defined already in the short-term. This applies, above all, to economic integration, especially a substantial FTA agreement. Ukraine is clearly the ENP country for which economic incentives matter most. In the field of energy relations the EU-first-strategy and the importance of Russia in EU energy policy affects the ENP like a huge shadow.
The analysis also demonstrates substantial asymmetries in the preferences and time horizons of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine across all dimensions, but in particular in economic (Ukraine:
fast and high; EU: slow and low) and JHA (Ukraine: free visa regime, additional rewards; EU: multipleapplicable small rewards, no further concessions) dimensions. In a sense, these asymmetries clearly reflect the inconsistency of the ENP concept mentioned above. According to this point, explanations of enlargement theories seem helpful: we must be aware that the prospects of compliance are negative, if relevant incentives are offered too far in the future.
The political instability of Ukraine since the Orange Revolution (government instabilities) has been a core obstacle to maximize Europeanization through the ENP. Domestic themes very often dominated the political agenda. In this context, the ENP acted as a catalyst but not as the main driver of Europeanization. The role of the domestic situation is predominant for the pace and degree of Europeanization. Our case study
shows that a certain stage of willingness and domestic motivation for institutional reform in the direction of good governance, democracy and Europeanization is an important precondition for implementing the ENP. Progress in Ukraine is therefore first and foremost a consequence of the home-driven dynamic for reform. Ukraine from the beginning of ENP-integration stated that the missing membership perspective is somehow humiliating. Its motivation for convergence with EU criteria is and remains the hope for EU membership, which the ENP does not offer. Such motivation is unstable and can disappear fast in an inconsistent instrument as the ENP is.
